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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN H. MORGAN, JR., JUSTHEIM PETROLEUM CO.,
a Nevada corporation, CLARENCE I.
JUSTHEIM and J. H. MORGAN, SR.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
- vs. UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS,
CHARLES R. HANSEN, CECIL THOMSON, DONALD SHOWALTER, M. V.
HATCH, HAROLD REESE, WHITNEY
J. FLOYD, PHILLIP CHRISTENSEN, T.
H. BELL and W. L. TUELLER,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12131

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs commenced this action to enjoin the defendants from issuing to a third party an oil shale lease upon
lands whiich are sulbject to their lease covering ltheoiland gas
deposits and the oil impregnated rocks and sands and also
to obtain broad declaratory relief.

DISPOSITION MADE OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER
COURT
The lower court granted the injunction requested by
plaintiffs.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellaruts seek a reversal of the judgment of the lower
coui:1t with directions to ditSmiss plaintiffs' ,amended oo'lnplaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts material to determination of this matter are
largely without dispute.
By plaintiffs' lease dated October 7, 1963, there is
granted the usual rights and privilegea underamine:r:wllease
with respect to asphaltic and bituminous sands. By an
amendment effectuatted in 1969, the lease was expanded to
cover other mineral substances, including oil and natural
gas, but excluding coal and oil shale. (R. 41-47) The lease
was recently assigned to the plaintiff Utah Resources International, Inc. (R. 33-34) On February 16, 1970, the defendant Board approved an application filed by a third party for
an oil shale lease covering the same land as plaintiffs' lease.
(R. 2, 86-87) The form of
proposed 1Jo be .granted to
the third party contains the usual rights under a mineral
lease with respect to oil shale, but does not contain a grant
of rights with respect to any of the substances enumerated
in plainrtiffs' lease. (Ex. D-15)
The lower court issued a preliminary and permanent
injunction whereby the defendants are:
" . . . permanently enjoined and restrained from
granting or issuing an 'Oil, Gas and Hydrocarbon
Lease' and/or an 'Oil Shale Lease' and/or any other
lease for the purpose of exploration for, development or recovery of, oil, gas and hydroca:r:bon lease
or for a mineral from which, when refined or pro-
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cessed. oil is the principle product to be produced
or recovered, upon Utah State lands upon which
there is already issued and outstanding an 'Oil and
Gas Leaise', an 'Asphaltic Sands-Bituminous Sands
Lease', an 'Oil Shale Lease', or an 'Oil, Gas and
Hydrocarbon Lease'." (R. 98-99)
Notice of appeal was filed on May 28, 1970. (R. 100101)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
OIL SHALE IS A MINERAL DIFFERENT THAN
PETROLEUM OR ROCKS AND SANDS IMPREGNATED
WITH PETROLEUM.
Plaintiffs and the lower court have relied chiefly, if not
entirely, upon this court's decision in M01·gan v. Utah Board
of State Lands, 21Utah2d 364, 445 P. 2d 776 (1968). That
decision, which will be called "the eariler Morgan case," is
of obvious importance here. There is a near identity of parties. Two of the individual plain'biffs and one of the corporate plaintiffs in the matter now before the court were the
plaintiffs in the earlier Morgan case and the defendants are
the succesors to the defendants previously named. Essentially, the same statutes are involved for further construction and interpretation.
Justice Tuckett well expressed the essence oflbhecontroversy in the earlier Morgan case in the final sentence of the
fir.st paragraph of ltis opinion in which he stated:
"We are here concerned chiefly with the issue as
to whether or not the oil recoverable under the bit-
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uminous sand lease is the same mineral as that recoverable under an oil and gas lease."
The question of whether different minerals are involved
is determinative. The earlier Morgan case holds that the
statute proscribes the issuance of two leases for the same
mineral - in that case petroleum - whether in reservoirs
or impregnated rocks or sands. But if the minerals are different, the statute in terms permits the Board to issue separate leases. The pertinent portions of Section 65-1-18, U.
C.A., 1953, read:
"In furtherance of the principle of multiple use
of state lands, the land board may grant a lease for
. . . any mineral notwithstanding the issuance of
other lease or leases on the same land for other minerals ... "
(Emphasis added)
It should be noted that the plaintiffs now take a posi-

tion diametrically opposed to the representations to this
court in the earlier Morgan case where at pages 29 and 30
of the plaintiffs' brief it was asserted:
"Morgan doesn't question the power of the Land
Board to classify different hydrocarbons as being
different minerals: Morgan only asserts that the
Land Board has no power to classify the same hydrocarbon, namely oil, as two different minerals depending on the geologic environment in which it
encountered.
"The propriety of the Land Board's distinguishing between oil and coal or gilsonite or kerogen (the
organic component of oil shale) was never an issue
in the lawsuit. Morgan is aware of no reason why
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these various substances should not be classified as
different minerals, each one has a significantly different molecular and atomic structure from each of
the others; no one of them occurs in close physical
or chemical association with any of the others, and
there is no evidence that the recovery of any one of
these suustances would necessarily entail recovery or
destruction of any of the others."
Defendants do not claim or assert that the plaintiffs
are estopped necessarily by their statements or the statements of some of them in said prior brief. But the defendants do urge that the foregoing quotations are factually and
legally correct. The suootances are separate minerals as will
next be fully demonstrated.
A. Petroleum and oil shale were formed in a different
manner and at a different time.

At the trial defendants produced Dr. John Osmond, an
expert in the field of geology, who was familiar with the
various minerals in the Uintah Basin, including both petroeum and oil shale. He testifed:
"The oil shales in the Green River formation
were formed by the abundant growth of algae and
the collection of spores and pollen in large lakes
which existed in Utah and Colorado and Wyoming."
(R. 171)
"Petroleum is usually formed from the decay of
organic matter, usually considered to be the bacterial action on small animals, and there is not a universally accepted explanation for the origin of liquid
oil." ( R. 172)
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B. Petroleum and oil shale are different minerals chemically and physicalily.
In Brennan v. Udall, 251 F. Supp. 12, 379 F. 2d 803,
(1967), two experts in the oil shale field, Dr. W. D. Chawner, a geologist and a witness for Brennan; and Dr. K. E.
Stanfield, a chemist and witness for the government, stipuhlJted as follows:
"Petroleum, oil shale and coal are all hydro-carbon mixtures, usually containing other elements,
such as sulphur, nitrogen and oxygen. The organic
materials in oil shale called 'Kerogen,' as well as the
organic materials in coal, are largely insoluable in
oil solvents, such as benzine, ether, etc., while petroleums are essentially completely soluble therein.
Each of these mixtures is a mixture of compounds;
each compound having an individual chemical formula, but none of the three groups has a specific formula. However, although oil, oil shale and coal may
contain the same elements, they are not chemically
combined in the same manner in the three substances."
Dr. Osmond concurred with the stipulation . (R. 182)
Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Francis W. Christensen, testified:
"Well, actually, if you wanted to relate differences, you could write a book on the differences.
They have ju.sit borne in on some specific bonding, I
presume - chemical bonding differences, ... " (R.
162)
An incident involving the exhibits in this case vividly
demonstrates beyond question that petroleum and oil shale
are physically different. Exhibit D-12 was a bottle liquid
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petroleum, which was broken by the Court Reporter, and
which ran over all the Exhibits in this case. Defendants'
Exhibit 11 is a sample of oil shale, a hard brittle rock, which
was entirely undamaged when it was dropped with the
other exhibts.
Perhaps the most complete and accurate, yet concise,
description of the nature of oil shale in the scientific writings of which this court takes judicial notice is by Felix Jaffee, in his study on oil shale published by the Colorado
School of Mines in its "Minerail Industries Bulletin", (1962),
Vol. 5, No. 2, March, where he states:
''Paradoxically, oil shale is not necessarily a
shale, nor does it contain oil. It can be broadly defined as a fine-grained, compact sedimentary rock,
which is generally laminated, and containing an organic high-molicular weight mineraloid of indefinite composition, which is derived chiefly from aquatic organisms, probably of algae origin, or from
waxy spores and pollen grain. This orgainc matter
is called kerogen, from the two Greek words meaning producer of wax. Thus, the name of kerogen
shale has also been suggested as being more appropriate than oil shale. One property which ic essential
to all types of true oil shales is that their organic
constituent is only slightly soluble, if at all, when
extracted with ordinary solvents for petroleum at
room temperature. Also, kerogen
petroleum
hydrocarbons only upon destructive distillation by
heat (pyrolysis) and subsequent refining (Bradley,
1931; Gavin, 1924; Levorsen, 1958). It is important
to note that retorting of oil shale yields shale oil,
which is not petroleum, but rather a black, waxy oil,
which freezes at room temperature, and contains not
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only carbon and hydrogen, but also oxygen, nitroge
and sulphur. Special refining methods are require
to convert shale oil into marketable products (Ert .
1955).
· io:
la
"Oil shales should not be confused with rock ff"
which are actuailly impregnated with oil, for exaill ,_,,
ple, the Athbaska sandstone (tar sand) of Alberta
Canada ... and finaHy, organic mineral substance
such as gHsoni!te or un:itaite and grap'hite 1arie varie
itres of asphalfa1tes, which are presumaJbly derive
from the metamorphism of petrdleum (Abrahaill
1960). These have no direot genciic or practica
conne0tion with oil shales, and thus wiH not be oon
siidered further in this study." (All emphai.sh
added.)

C. The Congress and agencies of the executive department of the Federal Government have many times determined that oil shale and petroleum are different minerals.
In Rmnon P. Coli·crt, Union
Company of CalifornW.
and F. H. Gower, Colorado 03022, etc., June 28, 1956, the
Department of Interior ruled:

" * * * these deposits [oil and gas - as opposed
to oil shale] are widely separated geologically and
are present in essentially different forms. Oil shale,
of itself, contains a vegetable or animal substance
from which oil can be made. Further, oil shale and
oil are leased under separate provisions of the mineral leasing laws. It is not necessary to resolve here
whether proceedings would be in order under Public
Law 585 if the identical minerals were sought by
each party; the minerals here involved are not identical within the purview of the United States mining
laws and the mineral laws and the mineral leasing
laws."

·e

e
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In State of Utah, et al. 71 I.D. 392, (1964), the Inter-

t ior Department specifically authorized the disposition of
lands containing oil shale providing the deposits of "oil and
k p:<!S" were reserved to the United States, noting:
n
"It would appear to follow that, if the base land
is mineral land and the selected land is both valuable
for oil shale and valuable for oil or gas and is situated within the known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field or included in a producing or
producible oiil and gas lease, the State may obtain
J.
the selected land, including the oil shale deposits
upon consenting to a reservation to the United
States under the 1914 act of rtlhe oil and gas in the
selecited land. We so conclude" (71 I.D. at 403-404).
Federal legislation treats said mineral substances separately. The Mineral Leasing Act, passed in 1920, repeatedly distinguishes between oil and oil shale, calling for different payments, different allowable acreages and different
methods of leasing for each. See 30 U.S.C. 181, 193, 212-227,
241. The Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1948 (30 U.S.C.
321) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to operate demonstration plants to produce synthetic liquid fuels from
coal, oil shale and other substances. And the Internal Revenue Code, including the 1969 Tax Reform Act, provide different tax treatment for 1Jhe separate minerals oH and gas
and oil shale. The Reform Act reduced percentage depletion
applicable to oi·l and gas wells from 27112% to 22%, (Section 501 ( 1) ) , but left the percentage rate ·alt 15 % for oil
shale (Section 501 (2), Conf. Com. Rept. P.L. 91-172, P.
314). In Revenue Ruling 57-529, 1957, Int. Rev. Bult No.
45 at 17, it was held:
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"'Oil shale' mined solely for its kerogen conteri m
not itself used as shale, is properly includable i
other minerals under Section 613 (b) (6) of th an
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and is subject to ut<
pletion at the rate of 15 percent. It appears tha co
'oil shale' does not contain oil as isuch, but contain al
kerogen, a mineral from which 'shale oil' is derive1
and for which it is mined. This distinction betwee1
'shale' and 'oil shale' is evident since shale is minei. u
and used as suoh, while oil shale i's mined and usei. l:c
merely as a source of kerogen ... "

It is also worthy of note that the statutes of our siste1
state, Colorado, differentiate between the tax treatment o1
the mineral oil and gas and the mineral oil shale. Under
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963, 138-1-23, subsection (2),
the depletion rate is 271;2 % in the case of an oil and gas well
and under the following subsection (3) (a), the depletion
for "flourspar, flake graphite, vermiculite ... oil shale, gil·
sonite" ... is 40 % of the gross income from the property
during a taxable year, with certain exclusions as therein
provided.

POINT II
DIFFERENT MINERALS ARE LEASABLE SEPARATELY REGARDLESS OF THE END PRODUCT
MANUFACTURED OR PROCESSED.
Plaintiffs' theory and argument in the lower court consisted almost entirely of attempts to show why the express
statutory permission to lease separrute minerals simultaneously does not apply in those cases where the same end pro·
duct from the separate minerals will be manufactured ulti·

p

1

1

11

n mately in a refinery. In the earlier Morgan case, plaintiffs
i argued successfully that the Legislature had placed the statutory phrase "for the same purpose on the same land" in a
context which compels "purpose" to be equated with "mineral." (plaintiffs' brief, page 4)
Despite their earlier argument which was accepted by
this court and despite the clear and unmistakable statutory
language, plainiJiffs now say that it is the ultimate end
product which is controlling even though different minera1s
in the ground are involved. Plain:tiffs' expert seems tJo concede the diff erenc&S in the mineral deposits, but argues
that there ris substantial iderutity in end use. With reference
to oil shale, he gave the following testimony:
"Mr. McGarry: I would just like to clarify that as

to whether or not in his opinion if it is petroleum.
The Court: Overruled. You may answer.
The \Vitness: Not in the sense that you can pump it
out as a fluid, but it is in the sense that the end use
would be a product which would be used for Q. I didn't ask you the end use. I just want

to know

whether or not it was petroleum in its natural state
in the ground?
A. Well, it's no more petroleum than natural gas is
petroleum, or you might say that your paraphin
base oil - are they petroleum, or aren't they?
Q. (by Mr. McGarry) Now, as I understand it, oil
shale contains an organic substance known as kerogen; is this true?

A. Yes.
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Q. Is kerogen petroleum?
A. \Vell, not any more than natural gas, or some of
the variances in this wide range of hydrocarbons is,
but it may be processed, you see, just like these
other products are, to produce gasoline and oil to be
used in industry.
Q. Now, after retort of oil shale and you extract an
oily substance known as shale oil, is that petroleum?
A. Well, this is a real difficult question to answer.
In terms of its refining and use, it's essentially identical, but there's a difference in the composition.
That's the point I'm trying to make." (R. 155)
The statute cannot be amended as plaintiffs would have
it amended under the guise of interpretation and construction. The Legislature has delegated to the Board cf State
Lands the cJ.uty and responsibility of ascertaining what min€ra1 development may be conducted compatibly with the extraction of other mineral deposits. Quoting again from
Section 65-1-18, U.C.A., 1953, we note particularly the following excerpts:

"In furtherance of the principle of multiple use
·Of state lands, the land board may grant a lease for
the prospecting, exploration, development and production of any mineral notwithstanding the issuance of other lease or leases on the same land for
other minerals, and shall include in such lease suitable stipulations for simultaneous operation . . ."
(Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the L€gislature has provided the
Board with a broad objective, the principle of multiple use

of the state lands. The issuance of a mineral lease in any
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c<:.se is permissive and not mandatory, the word "may" being used. But if the simultaneous leasing for different minerals is selected by the Board as the proper course of action,
then mandatory language requires that the Board include
"suitable stipulations." The Board has met its responsibilities ii1 this regard, not only by lease terms, but also by general regulations. Pertinent excerpts are incorporated in the
appendix for convenience. The full text of said rules and
i·eguh1Jtions and lease forms appear in the record. (Ex. D-4,
D-lS, D-16)

It would seem perfectly obvious that mineral leases
are issued for exploitation of mineral deposits, not for manufacturing processes. A mineral lease might be issued for
mining of iron ore; such ,a lease is not issued for the manufacture of steel. But confusion has arisen in the mind of
the learned frial judge from a misreading of Justice Tuckett's Opinion in the earlier Morgan case. What was involved there, as has already been noted, was the issue of
'vhcther the oil recoverable under a bituminous sand lease
is t:1c same mineral as tha.it recoverable under an oil and
1.r<1s lease. In that context, it was ruled that the
permitted bnt one lease for the production of oil (meaning
petroleum) from the same land at the same time. Plaintiffs would now prohibit otherwise valid mineral
on
a simultaneous basis because "oil" might be derived from
Pctth of the natural deposits severally leased. The lifting
of a word or phrase from an opinion for use out of context
k1s often l.Jeen condemned by the courts.
The wonls "oil" and "petroleum" are often used inter-
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changeably and synonymously, but they are not the sam
( R. 180) . There are many kinds of oil, such as soybean oil
peanut oil, whale oil, palm o'il and different vegetable oils
whic!h are not petroleum ( R. 178). "Coa:l Oil" is a:lso a typi
of ail manufaeitured from coal (R. 180). Oil manufacture1
from coal has been sold all over the 'World ,as "Coa!l Oil." !'
was made by hearting the coal, driiving off the volartiiles, an(
then dio.sfilling them ( R. 179-180) . Coal, as it occurs in
natural sitaJte in the ground, is not pet1101eum (R. 174). Oi
can be manufactured from gilsonite by heating, but gilson.
ite, as it occurs in ,its natural state in the g11ound, is nQI.
petroleum ( R. 17 4) . Oil can a·liso be manufactured froo
wood, garbage, or from any organic substance (R. 174-175)
Such manufacturing processes, irrespec1Jive of the specufa.
tion as to their poosiblie economic use or value, are
beside the point in the determining of the nature of thi
minera;l deposit which iis leased by :the Board.

POINT Ill

THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS HAS PRO·
MULGA'TED VALID RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHICH PERMIT THE SEPARATE LEASING QUES·
TIONED BY PLAINTIFFS.
For purposes of argument under this point, we assum1
(contrary to all of the foregoing) that there is a real ques·
tion of the validity of the distinction between petroleum am
oil shale as established by the lease forms and the genera
rules and regulations of the Board of State Lands. No on
can realistically contend that the actions of the Board in thi
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regard are fraudulent, devoid of reason, or impossible. It
becomes im1Jortant, therefore, to examine the function of the
courts in supervising the decisions of the Board.
The long and extensive experience of the courts of the
United States in reviewing the actions of the Secretary of
the Interior is most helpful. In the rather recent case of
Udall v. TaUman, et al., 380 U.S. 1 at 16, (1965), the United
States Supreme Court restated the principles as to the initial interpretation of a statute by the Secretary in these
words:
"When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the
interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration. 'To sustain
the Commission's application of this statutory term,
we need not find that its construction is the only
reasonable one, or even that it is the result we
would have reached had the question arisen in the
first instance in judicial proceedings.' Unemploynient Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153. See
also, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402; Universal
Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583.
Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake 'involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged
\Vith the responsibility of setting its machinery in
motion, of making the parts work efficiently and
smoothly while they are yet untried and new.'
Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396,
408.''
In many of the Federal Cases, there was involved a
"giving away" of public lands and mineral deposits under
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statutory plans which considered such gratuities to be in thi
public interest. \Ve believe that line of cases to be entire])
appropos. True, the plaintiffs do pay nominal annual renta
consideration and should there be some production fron
their lease will pay a nominal royalty all in accordanCi
with the lease terms (R. 41-47). But, if 1Jhe pl,aintiffs an
assumed to have some rights with respect to oil shale
coal in the land those assumed rights would have been re
ceived as a gratuity. In 1963, plaintiffs requested and
ceived a lease which covered oil impregnated sands. Tha1
lease when issued was perfectly lawful. No contention to the
contrary is made (R. 8). Plaintiffs paid nothing for, ana
could not have anticipated, their alleged rights to substancei
not covered by their lease as amended and, in fact, excludei
therefrom. As we understand plaintiffs' position, they now
assert a "Dog in the Manger" right to keep the state frorn
leasing the oil shale deposits excluded by the terms of theil
lease for what bargaining power benefits might accrue to
them. It seems particularly appropriate to apply the rule
which has evolved in the Federal courts, and that rule was
succinctly well stated by the Court of Appeals for the Dis·
trict of Columbia in Ickes v. Underwood, 141 F. 2d 546, 548
(C.A.D.C., 1944), cert. den., 323 U.S. 713:

"The Government may dispense its bounty on
such terms as it sees fit; and the executive agency
which Congress has chosen for the purpose of giving
away public lands and mineral deposits is peculiarly
equipped, in terms of experience and administrative
capacity, fo act in its behalf. When an executive
agency acts in this capacity, there is, perhaps, less
reason than in any other type of administrative
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adio11 to subject its determinations to judicial
review.''
In any event, and quite apart from the value of the
Federal p1·ecedents, 1it is clear that the Board of State
Lands has formally adopted fully considered lease forms and
general rul'es and regulations as set forth in defendants'
exhibits. In the promulgation of the same, full consideration
has been given to the decision of this court in the earlier
Ai o r.qan case.
It is axiomatic that such administrative action is pre-

sumed valid. Nothing appears in the record before this
court to overcome that presumption in any manner.

POINT IV
THE LEGISLATURE HAS BY RECENT ENACTMENTS AGAIN AUTHORIZED AND APPROVED THE
SEPARATE LEASING QUESTIONED BY PLAINTIFFS.
It may well be said that all of the foregoing discussion

was not necessary in view of the dispositive action of the
1969 session of the Legislature. However, the defendant
state officials and board felt that the public importance of
the issues, particularly the involvement of public funds, and
the desin1bility of clarification of this court's decision in
the earlier Morr;an case, justified an argument under the
foregoing points so that this court can interpret the 1969
legisl;ition being fully advised. The sections upon which
attention is now focused appear now as 65-1-111, 651-112, 65-1-113 and 65-1-114, and were enacted as Chapter

2:20,
full below:

of Utah, 1969. Those sections are reproduced in
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"65-1-111. Oil shale leases - State land boar,
authorized to participate in development progralll!
The state land board is hereby authorized to Pat
ticipate with its oil shale lessees in programs fo1
the development of technology for the econorni1
recovery of fuel substances from oil shale in th1
manner provided in this act."
"65-1-112. Oil shale leases - Application fo
credit against future rentals - Submission of plans
- A state oil shale lessee or lessees may apply t
the state land board for credit against future rentab
by submitting to the board the details of a plan fo
research, experimentation or investigation to <level·
op technology for the economic recovery of fue
substances from oil shale. The format of sue!
plan may be prescribed by the board."
"65-1-113. Oil shale leases - Approval of pla1
by board - Participation agreement - Amount ol
credit to be given. - If the board concludes that th!
plan submitted is meritorious and calculated t-0
advance oil shale technology, it may agree to par·
ticipate in the costs of the program submitted bi
crediting against rentals to become due in the future
under any or all oil shale leases held by said lessee
such proportion of the total costs of the progra111
as the board shall deem appropriate; provided, thal
credit shall not be given in an amount which reduces
the actual amount payable by the lessee under any
oil shale lease to less than fifty cents per acre per
year."
"65-1-114. Oil shale leases - Lessees to main·
tain records - Inspection - Accounting. - Lesseei
proceeding under a plan approved for state partici·
pation shall maintain accurate books and records
available for inspection by the board at all reason·
able times and shall submit an accounting to the
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board at the conclusion of the program and at any
other times the board requests."
The trial court reached the remarkable conclusion that
the quoted statutes referred only to oil shale leases which
were issued prior to May 9, 1967 (R. 109). One searches ithe
reported cases in vain for a more startling example of a
statutory construction by a trial court, which subverted the
very intent and purpose of the enactment. In fact, the
earlier Morgan case, the decision on which plaintiffs rely,
stands firmly for the proposition that a statute is to be construed and intenireted to accomplish the intent and purpose
which impelled the Legislature to act.

It is the legislatively declared policy of the state to encourage and participate in the development of technology
for the economic recovery of fuel substances from the oil
shale deposits in Uta:h. The Legislature has found such public interest in a possible future industry which could economically recover fuel substances from oil shale rock that it
has authorized the use cf monies for research and experimentation which would otherwise accrue to the funds of the
Board of State Lands and ultimately benefit educational and
other uses. There is no qualification in the invitation to oil
shale lessees to participate with the state to the extent provided. It is understandable that the plaintiffs would prefer
to have the older oil shale leases validated and encouraged
to the exclusion of newcomers, since the plaintiffs own some
of the old2r lenses and in instances made sales of leases covering· different minerals (R. 218, Exhibit D-17, D-18, D-19,
D-20) But the statutory privileges are extended by plain
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words to oil shale lessees and not alone to the plaintiff 0
shale lessees nor alone to oil shale lessees whose lease is o!(
er than a prior act of ithe Legisl ature. WhaJtever doubt (
question might be read 1into Section 65-1-18, U.C.A., 1953,a
amended in 1967, in its application to oil shale leases ha
been completely resolved by the 1969 Legislature in favo
of lease validity. Not only are such leases recognized as val
id, but research and experimentation thereunder are active!!
encouraged. The learned trial judge was grossly in errrn
in redrafting judicially the 1969 act, so as to limit its app!i
cation and in effect dampen and not encourage an emerg
ing industry. The error of such judicial redrafting ha
been often noted, as in Christner vs. Poudre Valley Cooper
ative Association, 235 F. 2d 946 at 950, ( 10 Cir. 1956)
where the Court of Appeals stated:
1

"Courts should confine themselves to the con
struction of a statute as it is written and not attemp.
to supply omissions or otherwise amend or changi
the law under the guise of construction."
Accord: Iselin vs. United States, (1926), 270 U.S. 245 a:
250-251.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court should be reversed anc
the case remanded with instructions to dismiss plaintiffs
amended complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
SHERIDAN L. McGARRY
Assistant Attorney General
SLM:bc
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APPENDIX

EXCERPTS FROM DEFENDANT'S RULES AND
REGULATIONS
"RULE 10 -

CLASSIFICATION OF MINERALS FOR
WHICH APPLICATION CAN BE MADE

2. Oil, Gas and Hydrocarbons - which shall mean
and include oil, natural gas, elaterite, ozocerite, and
other hydrocarbons (whether the same be found in
solid, semi-solid, liquid, vaporous or any other
form) including tar, bitumen, asphaltum and maltha, and other gases. The oil, gas and hydrocarbon
category shall not include coal, gilsonite, and oil
shale. The form of lease to be issued covering oil,
gas and hydrocarbons is as approved by the State
Land Board on June 8, 1967.
3. Oil Shale
sedimentary
of lease to be
by the State
"RULE 11 -

- which shall mean and include any
rock confa.ining kerogen. The form
issued covering oil shale is as approved
L<cnd Board on June 8, 1967."

GENERAL PROVISIONS ...

( d) It is the policy of the State of Utah to foster
:md promote multiple use and development of State
lands. Each lessee under a State of Utah mineral
lease shall conduct operations in such manner as
to avoid unreasonable and all unnecessary damage
or injury to mineral deposits and improvements
belonging to others including those belonging to
the State of Utah. lf the land board deems it necessary or advisable to do so, the land hoard may
designate any multiple use area as a critical area
and as to such areas, may require, in addition to
any and all other remedies, that, as a condition
to entering, drilling, mining, exploring, developing,
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penetrating, or excavating in or upon such stat
lands, such lessee furnish a bond or evidence 0
financial responsibility, in an amount deemed
quate by the land board, to assure that the stat
and other mineral Lessees shall be indemnified an
held harmless from and against unreasonable an
all unnecessary damage to mineral deposits or illJ
provements caused by the conduct of such activitie
by such Lessee in or upon such state lands. If anr
when the Land Board designates any area as a crib
cal area, written notice of such designation shal
be given to all state lessees in such area. Then
after, so that the land board may have opportunit:
to impose such requirement, each state Lessee whr
intends to conduct any or all of such activities i:
or upon such state lands, shall, prior to so doin1
provide the land board with written notice of sucl
intention and defer initiation of any such activitie
until the said bond or evidence of financial respon
sibility has been furnished pursuant to written ad
vice of the land board so requiring or until receip
of written advice given by the land board tha
neither such bond nor such evidence is require<l
Land board advice to such lessee, as contemplate
by the foregoing, shall be given within thirty (30:
days following receipt by the land board of saii
notification by such lessee. Any bond required pur
suant to this Rule 11 ( d) shall at the election
the land board be in lieu of the bonds requiret
under Rule 12 of these regularoions."
EXCERPTS FROM DEFENDANT'S APROVED OIL,
GAS AND HYDROCARBON LEASE FORM

"Section 1. RIGHTS OF LESSEE - That Lesso!
... does hereby grant and lease to Lessee the follow
ing described tract of land ... for the purposes am
with the exclusive right of prospecting for, of min
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ing for, of excavating, quarrying, or strip mining
for and/or drilling for oil, natural gas, elaterite,
ozocerite, other hydrocarbons (whether the same be
found in solid,
liquid, vaporous or any
other form) including tar, bitumen, asphaltum, and
maltha, other gases (whether combustible or noncombustible), sulphur (except the metallic sulphides
such as pyrite, marcasite and chalcopyrite) and associated substances of whatever kind or nature and
whether or not similar to those hereinabove mentioned but excluding coal and oil shale (the hydrocarbons and other materials granted hereby being
hereinafter collectively called 'said substances') and
producing, taking and removing such substances
from the above described lands . . . . "
EXCERPTS FROM DEFENDANT'S APPROVED OIL
SHALE LEASE FORM

"Section l. RIGHTS OF LESSEE. LESSOR . . .
does hereby grant, lease, let and demise unto LESSEE the exclusive right and privilege to prospect
and explore for and to drill for, mine, extract, or
otherwise remove, and dispose of oil shale, in, upon
or under the following described land . . .
The LESSEE shall have no right under this lease
to recover any substances, ·either combustible or
11011-combustible, which is produced in a gaseous
or rarified state at ordinary temperature and pressure conditions other than gas which results from
transformation of kerogen in oil shale by artificial
introduction of heat; nor shall the LESSEE have
the right to recover any liquid hydrocarbon substance which occurs naturally in a liquid form in
the earth, including drip gasoline or other natural
condensate recovered from gas; nor shall the LESSEE have the right to recover gilsonite, elaterite,
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ozocerite, other hydrocarbons (whether the s
be found in solid, semi-solid, liquid, vaporous
any other form) including tar, bitumen, asphalt
maltha and associated substances unless they res
from transformation of kerogen in oil shale by a
ficial introduction of heat."

